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1 INTRODUCTION
Looking at possible research sites in eastern Sierra
Leone in 1978, I one day came across a striking
cartoon executed in charcoal on the wooden window
shutter of a mud-built house in an isolated village
close to the Liberian border. It pictured a helicopter
observing two village women pounding rice in a
mortar. Seemingly the message was not only that
'modern' and 'traditional' are contemporaneous, but
also that representatives of these two worlds are
now engaged in mutual observation. The watchers
within the helicopter are themselves observed; the
village artist draws (and draws conclusions about)
what has been seen.
The cartoon was prophetic. Over-run by guerrillas
of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in April
1991, the Sierra Leone-Liberia border zone now finds
itself under regular scrutiny from the air by war-
planes of the West African Intervention Force.
This article outlines some ways in which the
exposure of youth in the region to international
electronic media has affected the course of this
rebellion, spawned by the civil war in Liberia.
2 DIAMONDS AND YOUTH ON THE SIERRA
LEONE-LIBERIA BORDER
Diamonds are the major mineral resource of the
Sierra Leone-Liberia border region. Large-scale
multi-national diamond mininginSierra Leone ceased
some years ago, because of the difficulty in prevent-
ing freelance diggers creaming off the best stones;
illicit mining is easily done by excavating swamps
and stream beds during the dry season and sieving
the gravel before the rainy season flood overtakes
the makeshift workings. In the mid 1980s the govern-
ment of Sierra Leone opened the concession areas
fully to small-scale operators.
Sponsors of small-scale diamond mining operations
(typically_ Lebanese, Guinean and Sierra Leonean
traders, and government functionaries) hold a gov-
ernment licence to mine, and work concessions
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leased from local land owners. Licensed operators
tend to operate on more accessible and better-
serviced sites, at times using pumping and
dredging gear. But there is a significant minority
of unlicensed operators, frequently working remote
government land, e.g. forest reserves along the
Liberian border.
Miles away from roads and official scrutiny these
squatters use only the simplest equipment - some-
times nothing more than a bucket, spade and sieve.
The loyalty of diggers on the border to either the
Sierra Leone or Liberian state has been dubious for
many years; politically foot-loose, they were a prime
target for recruitment by the RUF during the 1991
invasion of the border zone (Richards 1993).
Quite commonly the financial backer and licence-
holder of a typical Sierra Leonean small-scale
diamond mining operation will be permanently resi-
dent in town (having a business to run, or official
duties to discharge). The mining operation is left
largely to the initiative of a site foreman and crew of
young labourers. This is typical on remote workings
where conditions are at their most arduous, and
regular supervisionby a sponsor impracticable. Four
Limba miners, encountered miles off the beaten track
in the heart of the Gola North forest reserve in
November 1989, heading for Pandebu, a diamond
village on the border, had been sponsored by a doctor
in a government hospital in NW Sierra Leone. His
chances of making a site visit - one day by road and
a day's trek across the forest - were zero.
In most cases the sponsor supplies diggers with
rice, tools, and often a shot-gun and cartridges to
hunt for the pot. The digging crew generally split a
two-fifths share of the local price for each season's
haul of diamonds.
Much of the profit in diamonds is made in
exporting them to Europe and the Middle East.
Members of digging crews are sometimes tempted
to abscond with large diamonds. This is not as
easy an option as it might appear. Diggers lack
the contacts, documentation and knowledge to sell
directly on the international market. Collusion among
crew members is threatened by whistle-blowers, al-
ways well-paid by sponsors for information. The
police also find themselves promptly rewarded for
their vigorous pursuit of diamond cases. Not a few
sponsors are well-armed and prepared to take the
law into their own hands. Finally, and perhaps most
crucially, an absconding digger will find it hard to
sell a stone without provenance at anything ap-
proaching its true value. The main dealers have good
local intelligence networks, and offer only minimal
prices for suspect stones. Many diggers concede that
it is hardly worth risking a long-term stable relation-
ship with a sponsor for such dubious returns. They
prefer to try and save enough from regular work to
acquire a licence of their own.
Meanwhile, any ready cash is used5. ease the
hardship and tedium of life in the busFt: The leisure-
time activities of diggers are fairly basic. The occa-
sional visit to town to stock up on supplies may
offer the chance to see the latest films in cinemas and
video parlours. Not a few young miners have part-
completed secondary (in some cases ünfversity)
education, and thirst for knowledge of contempo-
rary political events. During the Gulf War a Leba-
nese diamond dealer in Bo did good business
re-broadcasting each morning in his cinema CNN
footage of the Gulf War, taped from a domestic
satellite TV installation during the night. In the bush,
crews relax with music, radio, drink, gambling
and recreational drugs (mainly cannabis, but 'crack'
cocaine is increasingly available). At weekends and
holidays itinerant video shows touted around the
camps and villages of the mining areas are a greatly
welcome diversion.
3 RAMBO AND REALITY
'Abdul' and 'Yusuf' are now in their mid-thirties.
They were early drop-outs from Koranic school; their
father, a Mandingo merchant from Guinea, forbade
other forms of education on religious grounds. When
teenagers, they ran away to the diamond-mining
areas, where they picked up work as labourers on
unlicensed diggings. Unmarried, and still dreaming
of making their fortunes in diamonds, Abdul and
Yusuf today scrape a living touring the remote min-
ing localities of the border zone, showing films on a
borrowed video machine powered by a portable
generator. The video player and generator belong to
a friendly sponsor in Bo.
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A token payment (perhaps some free tickets) to the
village chief and elders secures the use of the open-
sided village court house - the ban. Abdul borrows
benches from the school. Yusuf is busy stringing up
old sheets and rush mats to block the sight lines of
by-standers without tickets. As darkness falls Abdul
sells tickets, while Yusuf tinkers with the generator.
Around eight the machine kicks into life, and the
show begins. Perhaps 50 or loo people (young men
from the diamond workings, but also village people)
have paid about 30-50 pence each to see a Hong
Kong Kung Fu epic, or Hollywood's latest attempt to
live down the nightmare of the Vietnam war.
Abdul and Yusuf typically exploit a pitch for about a
week, and then move on to the next largish village a
few kilometres down the road. Some of their takings
are needed to buy fuel for the generator and pay
other local expenses and some is set aside to return to
the owner of the set and films. The balance (perhaps
a third) is profit, to be saved for the day when they
will have enough to buy a licence and mine for
diamonds on their own account.
Abdul and Yusuf are articulate about audience
tastes. They know that 'action' films (essentially a
genre comprising Kung Fu and American war mov-
ies, but including violent science fiction epics such as
Terminator) have the greatest drawing potential
among their best customers, the diamond crews. But
Indian 'love' films also attract good audiences.
Indian films, Yusuf explains, are about social rela-
tionships; about how to build such relationships for
a long-term future. Young women like them a lot for
this reason, but women are in a minority in diamond
camps. Women are prevented from visiting work
sites for fear of spoiling the diggers' luck (heija).
Action films appeal because they are regarded as
teaching the skills and attitudes needed to survive on
your own in a hostile world (See Appendix). Rambo
is especially admired. In Abdul's enthusiastic re-
telling of his hero's death-defying tricks it is not hard
to detect echoes of Musa Wo, the trickster figure
whose wilful schadenfreude is tolerated within the
Mende moral universe as a harbinger of fruitful new
social trends (Cosentino 1989).
Rambo films, Yusuf asserts, are a window on reality.
'We Africans' he says 'are slow to learn, but films
help bring home quickly what the world is like, and
the tricks you need to survive'. Rambo prepared him,
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he claims, to understand the first news of the RUF
invasion of eastern Sierra Leone in April 1991. 'We
were excited' he says 'that change was coming';
specifically that the rebels would sweep away the
corruption and inertia of the two decades in which
an APC regime had presided over a collapsing
economy, and sharply diminished educational and
employment prospects.
Abdul and Yusuf both had wondered briefly about
joining the rebels. Possessing little property them-
selves they may not have been deterred by villagers'
reports of extensive looting by the RUF. They were
alarmed, however, by the evidence of widespread
wanton and terroristic violence against civilians.
Quickly sensing that behind the RUF was a group of
business speculators not significantly different from
the class of sponsors currently in the driving seat of
the diamond economy, Abdul and Yusuf's moment
of infatuation with the idea of rebellion soon passed.
Both had become enthusiastic supporters of a youth-
oriented NPRC military regime. They now anx-
iously wait for the moment the rebellion will be
finally quashed so that they can head east and resume
life on the road with their small dream machine.
Yusuf thought the diamonds would always be there
- new ones work their way upwards from deep in the
ground all the time. They carry within them their
finder's names, if only the finder has the courage to
keep on looking. If the mining economy ever col-
lapsed, he would go back to farming - cassava,
probably. Abdul mocks him for his lack of foresight;
'how will he ever make a farm "with a slack body",
the brother cruelly observes.
The news is that Tongo Field is reckoned secure from
further rebel advance. Later in the day Abdul and
Yusuf are seen heading for the Kenema motor park,
their total possessions squeezed into a small box
hardly larger than a woman's handbag. They are
planning to wash gravel until the dry season arrives.
They will then return to Bo for their equipment and
the new season's crop of videos.
4 VIDEO VIOLENCE AND YOUTH REBELLION
4.1 The RUF Rebellion
The roots of the RUF seemingly lie in a period of
intense student opposition to Siaka Stevens in the
1970s. Libya provided refuge for a number of student
activists exiled by Stevens. More recently some RUF
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activists (the movement claims to have been formed
in 1982) undertook guerrilla training in Benghazi
preparatory to launching an invasion of eastern and
southern Sierra Leone from territory controlled by
Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) faction in Liberia. Foday Sankoh, leader of
the RUF, and other members of the movement, fought
alongside the NPFL when it entered Nimba County
(Liberia) from Cote d'Ivoire in December1989. Taylor
promised support for the Sierra Leone rebellion in
return. During the early stages of the RUF incursion
into Sierra Leone, April-July 1991, much of the fight-
ing was in the hands of NPFL fighters and Burkinabe
mercenaries, while large numbers of Sierra Leonean
youths - including many diamond diggers from re-
mote workings along the border - were recruited for
military training. In some cases adhesion may have
been voluntary. But in other cases recruitment was
by force; backsliders appear to have been compelled
to take part in atrocities against local civilians, to
break decisively their ties with the local community.
Loyalty to the RUF was further guaranteed by tatooing
the young recruits, thus readily identifying deserters
and threatening reprisals from government forces.
The origins of the RUF are opaque, as are its
political aims. It was unknown within Sierra Leone
until it launched its military campaign in March
1991. With only slender resources, its field plan
seems to have been to try and provoke the collapse of
the government of President Momoh as much through
the ingenious application of terror tactics as through
limited military engagement along the border. The
locally recruited 'youth army' was at first more a
means of demonstrating local political support than
a fighting force.
Plans appear to have been blown off course by greater
than anticipated military opposition. Much of this
came from Liberian irregulars hastily recruited from
among the many refugees in Sierra Leone opposed to
the NPFL. RUF progress through the diamond dis-
tricts of eastern Sierra Leone was also restricted by
Guinean troops fighting under the terms of the Sierra
Leone-Guinea defence pact, during which time the
small and ill-equipped Sierra Leone army was able to
improve its baic military competence.
The rebels were then pushed back towards the
border in August-September 1991, but further
progress by Sierra Leone forces was undermined by
ineptitude and corruption within the government.
This led to a protest by young officers from the war
front over pay and equipment that escalated into
a coup against President Momoh in April 1992. The
new National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)
military government, recognizing the extent to which
the RUF rebellion was a campaign for the hearts
and minds of disaffected youth within Sierra
Leone, promptly organized a vigorous and effective
youth secretariat NASMOS to carry out a number of
urban renewal campaigns. Regular street cleaning
and wall painting (some apparently spontaneous
manifestations of popular support for the NPRC
regime) have served since to symbolize the repair of
many years of corruption and neglect under the APC
(Opala 1993).
Having been out-gunned by the NPRC for the
loyalty of Sierra Leonean youth the RUF seemingly
re-focused its war aims on more strictly material
targets. The October-December 1992 campaign to
capture and control diamond-rich Kono District made
overt the concern of the RUF's alleged French and
Ivoirian-based business backers to divert the flow of
Sierra Leone's diamonds from established Guinean
and Senegambian networks towards Abidjan, via
Taylor's 'Greater Liberia'.
Suspension of its political programme in favour of
diamond mining ended any RUF claims to the moral
high ground in Sierra Leonean politics (claims earlier
tarnished by the brutality of the Liberian and
Burkinabe mercenaries fighting on its behalf). Ordi-
nary Sierra Leoneans found there was little to choose
between RUF war-lords and the political lackeys of
the rich diamond mining 'barons' they sought to
replace (not to mention those government troops
allegedly too busy digging diamonds to secure the
state's defences). Military reverses in late 1993 may
have spelt the end of the RUF as a force for youth
rebellion in Sierra Leone.
4.2 The blighted dreams of youth
The 10-18 age cohort in Sierra Leone has risen from 15
to 20 per cent of the total population since the first
census in 1963. In some ways it this group that has
borne the brunt of recent economic decline. The
school system is collapsing and job prospects are
minimal, external aid is tied to structural adjustment
and progress towards democratization. IMF-led fis-
cal prudence threatens to constrain educational op-
portunities still further. But not even the most doctri-
naire supporters of Western systems of representa-
tive democracy seriously propose reducing the vot-
ing age to incorporate ten-year old children on the
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street. 'Democratization' offers little or no immedi-
ate appeal to this youth cohort. Instead, young
people turn to the products of the international me-
dia industry for political solace. Cheap or free, and
readily accessible, global media products are one of
the few changes for the better in the lives of these
young people in recent years. Where once educa-
tional advancement beckoned, the bright light of
hope on the political horizon is now provided by re-
enacting the exploits of Rambo and Ninja Turtles.
An eye-witness in NPFL head-quarters town Gbarnga
in 1990 described five generator-driven video par-
lours running 24 hours a day to supply young rebel
fighters with a diet of Rambo and Terminator-style
films (Richards 1993). This raises the question whether
rebel strategists were simply building upon estab-
lished patterns of entertainment, or had it in mind
from the outset quite consciously to manipulate to
their own ends the mythic revolutionary charters
already part-elaborated from international media
materials by the mobile, media-conscious youth of
these remote rural regions in interior Liberia and
Sierra Leone.
A number of press reports have commented on the
Rambo or Kung-Fu dress styles affected by young
NPFL and RUF fighters in the field. Some rebels have
been filmed or photographed kitted out in battle
dresses comprising horror-comic masks, wigs and
women's dresses. Attracted to the bizarre like wasps
to jam, the Western Press implicitly contrast this
'inexplicable' behaviour with the 'clean','rational'
warfare of Western armies in the Gulf (Moran 1994).
But far from being inexplicable, the costumed fighter
(Mary Moran argues) is a reversion to the idiom of
pre-colonial African warrior, in which individuality
of costume was expressive of a mastery of all kinds of
trickery and deep inner resourcefulness.
The image of the uniformed, dragooned, govern-
ment foot soldier sums up for the rebel (Moran
suggests) some of the key contradictions of African
(post-colonial) modernity. The Liberian dictator
Doe, focus of NPFL hatred, was the very embodi-
ment of the unreflective, ill-trained and brutal
soldiery upon which West African states, imploding
with corruption and the strains of structural adjust-
ment, depend for their political 'stability'. Hope for
these young revolutionaries, therefore, resides in
rejecting conventional military uniform and reviving
the brilliant unconventionality of the pre-colonial
warrior tradition.
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Invoking the warrior's spirit some NPFL and RUF
rebels relate their costumes to the established mas-
querades of the region (hunter's dances for example,
in which the new and old are brought together in
jarring juxtaposition). Others opt for the brilliant
modernist inventions of Bruce Lee, Rambo or a pack
of Ninja Turtles. Either way, the message seems tobe
that failed structures can be swept aside, and new
political beginnings launched, only through the
cleansing actions of the warrior, attired beyond the
bounds of convention, in garb that speaks of inner
resource and supreme cunning.
4.3 Child soldiers
Seemingly, the NPFL was the first armed faction in
the region to recruit, train and field under-age fight-
ers (some ten-years old or less). Under-age fighters
are said to be particularly effective in battle because
they are unrestrained by fear or convention. They
make up in warrior-like resourcefulness what they
lack in strength or experience. The RUF copied the
NPFL, and battle-front commanders of the Sierra
Leone government forces, seeking to fight fire with
fire, followed suit. Under-age troops on the govern-
ment side have now been stood down and are
undergoing rehabilitation. Evidence of deployment
of child soldiers in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone is consistent with my argument that these
rebellions reflect a concern for political empower-
ment on the part of an age group normally consid-
ered too young to participate in representative de-
mocracy. Supporters of democracy within Africa
may have to debate at what age citizens begin to vote
in a region where, typically, half the population or
more is under 18 years old.
5 CONCLUSION
First let me be clear about what I not arguing - I am
not suggesting that violence-as-entertainment is a
cause of war in the Sierra Leone-Liberia border zone.
APPENDIX
A note on youth exposure to video in Sierra
Leone
AbOUt 200 young Sierra Leoneans have been inter-
viewed concerning their leisure pursuits and expo-
sure to electronic media, as part of a study of their
awareness of conservation issues in West Africa (an
ESRC-funded study jointly directed by Philip
Burnham, Michael Rowlands and myself). The fol-
lowing results derive from a sub-sample of 65 inter-
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What I am suggesting is that the ready availability
and recent spread of violence-as-entertainment meets
a widespread political need among youth in the
region - the need to celebrate the unconventional
inventiveness of those (primarily the young) who are
as yet outsiders to the political process. I have no
military knowledge, but somehow I doubt Rambo
and Kung Fu films convey any useful practical infor-
mation about combat. The interpretations young
Sierra Leoneans read into this material concern the
neglected potential value to society of the quick-
witted inventiveness of the young (see Appendix),
rather than the practical utility of violence. Ido think,
however, it likely that the organizers of the NPFL and
RUF rebellions seized upon this youthful enthusi-
asm for violence-as-entertainment as a recruiting
ploy, and later were happy to tap its military and
terroristic potential. There is evidence to suggest
that, having hooked their followers, RUF and NPFL
commanders set about converting violence-as-play
to violence-for-real by embroiling young enthusiasts
in terroristic atrocities from which there was no hope
of return. We should hesitate to blame Rambo for
cynical exploitation of youthful enthusiasm by op-
portunist elders as old as history itself.
Although there has been insufficient space in this
short article to deal with gender dimensions of the
RUF rebellion, it should be noted that 'action' films
appeal to young women also (see Appendix), and
young women joined the RUF as battle-field combat-
ants. Since the young women I have interviewed
tend to be more shrewd than young men in their
assessment of the propensity for real violence to
spread with unmanageable consequences, this en-
thusiasm for 'action' ifims may add strength to the
conclusion that, in the absence of any experience of
the violent realities of war, the basis of the RUF's
appeal was the scope the movement appeared to
offer to those concerned to celebrate the cleverness
of unenfranchized youth.
-
views from young people living in Bo, Freetown and
Kambia District. Fifty three (86 per cent) had some
exposure to films on video. Of these, 19(36 per cent)
claimed a preference for films they categorized as
'war', 'action' or 'Rambo'; 9 were females, 14 Mus-
lims and 15 had secondary or post-secondary educa-
tion. Nearly all the sample thought they acquired
valuable information or vicarious experience about
life from watching such filins. Females tended to
'read' such films as warnings about potential future
dangers (including ment), and when to flee (the
cornmentby the young women who felt a knowledge
of Rambo films had given her the courage to flee
through the bush to escape the rebel invasion of
Kono is especially poignant); males tended to
imagine that videos of violence added to their skill
in fighting.
Male reasons for preferring violent videos:
'to learn about methods of self-defence'
'teaches you how to manoeuvre in times of
trouble'
'shows how strength is displayed'
'it is pleasing'
'to gain some skills'
'teaches you how to be strong for the future'
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